The Islamic Republic survives through ideological coalition-building, disciplined crisis management, propaganda, and coercion, exploiting religious authority and social fragmentation to outlast repeated shocks, protests, and sanctions.
Since its official establishment on February 11, 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has repeatedly been on the brink of collapse. During the first 50 days before the referendum, the country experienced three internal conflicts in three regions (Kurds, Arabs in Khuzestan, and Turkmens). The first nationwide protests occurred prior to the April 1, 1979 referendum, led by women opposing mandatory hijab. From June 1999 to January 2026, Iran experienced seven major nationwide protests, three of which brought the country close to governmental collapse. The country has endured severe economic crises. To better understand the severity, based on field estimates, a basic service worker in the United States earns approximately $2,500 per month, while an Iranian worker performing harder and longer tasks earns no more than $200 per month. Over these years, Iran has fought two wars and faces the potential of a third. It has also endured more than 30 years of harsh sanctions, yet the Islamic Republic remains the primary governing authority.
So, why has the Iranian government survived these 47 years?
Any of the crises experienced by the Islamic Republic over these 47 years—if experienced by other countries—would likely have led to governmental collapse much earlier. For example, according to official government data, food inflation in Iran reached approximately 49% and 57%, while during Egypt’s 2011 revolution, food inflation was 11.7%, and in Libya during the same year, it was 15.4%. In other words, the Islamic Republic has survived severe sanctions, two wars, more than seven nationwide protests, and serious economic crises.
This article attempts to answer this question through the analysis of behavioral and cognitive patterns across three historical periods, based on the culture and habits of the Iranian people. It should be noted that this article is written inside Iran, relying on real data, direct observations, and limited access to international news due to restricted internet.
Ideological Roots of the 1979 Revolution
To understand this, one must examine Ayatollah Khomeini’s strategy as early as 1964. At that time, Iran was recognized as an economically developing country under a constitutional monarchy and free-market system. In such systems, economic inequality naturally arises: large groups of people who are left behind economically perceive this as injustice, which creates fertile ground for socialist ideas. Khomeini, leading a revolutionary movement, faced two main challenges: the entrenched economic development and the powerful military.
Leftist ideology alone could not challenge Iran’s strong economic system, especially as groups like the Tudeh Party (intellectual left) and the Mo’tadelion (classical left) had largely failed. To advance an Islamist agenda, Khomeini needed mass support. The most effective strategy was to combine leftist ideas appealing to the economically marginalized with Islamic ideas capable of attracting the middle and upper classes, who still maintained religious and cultural ties dating back to previous eras, such as the Qajar period.
Regarding military power, Khomeini could leverage the armed leftist groups—the Mojahedin-e Khalq (founded April 1970) and the Fedaiyan-e Khalq (founded December 1970)—which initially acted independently but ultimately contributed to the success of the 1979 revolution.
As a result, a powerful tool emerged: the combination of religious ideology with militant leftist tactics. Khomeini’s support base consisted of three main groups:
· The economically marginalized
· The middle and upper classes with strong religious beliefs
· The indifferent or “grey” population, who aligned with Khomeini out of fear of militant groups
Between February 11 and April 1, 1979, these three groups, under the religious leadership of Morteza Motahhari and guidance from Bazargan, were able to neutralize women’s protests over the compulsory hijab, even before any government program had been announced.
Religious Beliefs in Iran
Religion has deep roots in Iran, with organized religious practice spanning over 3,000 years. Religious norms have long served as a red line for human rights activities, from ancient dynasties to modern governments. Iran was the first country to officially adopt a single religion even before the invention of writing, granting religious leaders a prominent role in governance. Religious authorities had voting rights in parliament, and from 628 CE onward, following the Arab conquest, the religious system gradually adopted Islam.
Over approximately 1,400 years, the intensity of religious orthodoxy has fluctuated. Periods like the Safavid and Qajar eras were more radical, while others, like the Zand dynasty, were less strict. Nonetheless, religious belief has always been present.
This historical religious foundation underpinned Khomeini’s “silent strategy” to counter the capitalism of ths Shah era: combining an exaggerated religious authority—granting sanctity and divine legitimacy to leaders—with radical leftist ideas.
Iran After the 1979 Revolution
Immediately after the revolution, in 1980, the Combatant Clergy Association was established. A second, non-clerical party—the Mojahedin-e Enghelab—served as a secondary mechanism to address potential failures of the clerical party. In 1999, this party evolved into the Reformist Party. Other parties outside this ideology, such as the Mardomsalari Party founded by Mostafa Kavakebian, were unable to gain power.
Examining the commonalities among parties during this period, terms such as “Mujahid,” “fighter,” “cleric,” “Islam,” and “revolution” dominate, reflecting the shared philosophy: the blending of strict religious interpretation with radical leftist principles.
Crisis Management in the Islamic Republic
This ideological framework has shaped Iran’s strategies for handling crises:
1. Financial crises (inflation, sanctions, price shocks)
Islamic teachings emphasize modesty and frugality. In times of hardship, religious leaders encourage reduced consumption, substitution of staple grains, fewer daily meals, or low-cost goods instead of modern alternatives. Historical precedent shows this approach has been repeatedly employed.
2. Political crises
From the outset, slogans such as “We are the oppressed of the world” or “Revolution of the barefoot” framed the political narrative. Anti-Western sentiment, especially anti-Americanism, has concentrated public opinion around government objectives. Promises of becoming a global power or achieving development distract from internal political pressures. Propaganda and media control have been central to political success. (External influences—such as the 2006 European economic crisis or shifts in US-China economic power—have had an effect).
3. Social crises
In all Iranian protests, only the 2026 nationwide protests prominently demanded regime change, while prior demonstrations mostly sought cultural or economic reforms. The 2022 protests focused on mandatory hijab laws, while 2019 protests concerned fuel prices and economic reforms. Government suppression—via official forces like the IRGC and informal militias such as Basij—along with fear of arrest or harm, and tactics to exhaust protesters, have historically quelled unrest. For example, in 2009 and 2022, protests gradually dissipated after months of persistence.
Conclusion
The combination of leftist tactics and religious authority—emphasizing decisions as divinely sanctioned and beyond challenge—has been a dominant strategy for governing the Iranian populace, which has experienced modern development yet suffered severe economic decline. Clerics have intervened when needed to direct crises and pacify the public, while political leaders (essentially clerics in suits) have subtly manipulated social structures. When these mechanisms failed, armed forces intervened.
Looking forward, strategies to challenge this resilient system appear to follow two main scenarios:
1. Eroding ethical legitimacy through highlighting the human costs of repression—a scenario already underway.
2. External military-economic pressure from a superior power—a scenario that, at the time of writing, seems increasingly imminent
