Anti-regime slogans are composed of 65% targeting Khamenei/the Islamic Republic, 20% invoking Pahlavi, and 14% focused on economic demands—while democracy, organization, and “Woman, Life, Freedom” are absent.
This study is based on the collection and coding of slogans heard in social media videos (excluding universities) from the first six days of the Dey 1404 protests across Iranian cities.
Overall, 65% of slogans targeted Khamenei and the Islamic Republic as a whole, 20% expressed Pahlavi nostalgia or called for the return of monarchy, and 14% focused on economic and livelihood demands.
1. Anti-Khamenei slogans and the negation of the regime as a whole (the central slogans)
The highest frequency of slogans falls into this category. Explicit slogans against the Supreme Leader and the entire system indicate a high level of dissatisfaction, a complete move beyond any reformist orientation, and a focus on overthrow.
The slogan “Death to Khamenei” was heard in cities including Arak, Urmia, Ilam, Bandar Abbas, Dezful, Zahedan, Sabzevar, Farsan, Qom, Karaj, Nurabad-e Mamasani, Marvdasht, Yasuj, and several other locations. The slogan “Death to the dictator” was heard in Abdanan, Isfahan, Ilam, Tehran, Zahedan, Sabzevar, Fooladshahr, Kermanshah, Nurabad-e Mamasani, Hamedan, and Yasuj.
The high frequency of slogans such as:
• “Death to Khamenei”
• “Death to the dictator”
• “Death to the whole system”
• “Khamenei is a murderer; his rule is illegitimate”
• “We don’t want the Islamic Republic”
shows that the core of the protests is situated in the phase of negating the existing system. These slogans have been repeated most often across different cities and, quantitatively, form the discursive backbone of the protests. The key point is that this negation lacks a clear affirmative alternative and, more than representing a political project, expresses opposition to the ruling regime.
If some described the Dey 1396 revolt (November 2017–January 2018) as an “uprising of the hungry,” and Aban 1398 (November 2019) as an explosive revolt centered on economic shock and the fuel price hike, and if the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising was framed as a feminist revolution, then this time all slogans—without exception—are borrowed from earlier movements, even from the Green Movement of 1388 (2009). This full reproduction of the past not only indicates that the rightful demands of previous movements have not been realized; it also points to ideological stagnation and a backward-looking orientation.
2. Slogans related to Pahlavi
Although statistically these slogans come after the system-breaking slogans, their dispersion across different cities indicates the vitality of a current that seeks its alternative in reviving the previous regime.
a) Slogans centered on Pahlavi nostalgia: a mythic rereading of the past
The slogan “Reza Shah, may your soul be blessed” appears not merely as historical praise, but as a political act. It is a symbolic protest against present dysfunction through invoking the authority of a Bonapartist figure credited with “building” modern Iran. Here, “nostalgia” does not mean a transition to the future; it functions as a tool for returning to the past.
b) Slogans calling for the return of monarchy
Slogans such as “Long live the Shah” and “This is the final battle; Pahlavi will return” explicitly emphasize a monarchist alternative.
The importance of the following slogans is moderate but meaningful:
• “Long live the Shah”
• “Reza Shah, may your soul be blessed”
• “This is the final battle; Pahlavi will return”
• “Wail, Seyyed Ali—Pahlavi is coming”
• “This is the national slogan: Reza, Reza Pahlavi”
This semantic current oscillates between two poles: “historical longing” and “the political project of monarchism.” Although, based on current data, this discourse has not yet become an inclusive hegemonic discourse, its persistent and recurring presence across different geographies of the country indicates a clear polarization that cannot be ignored in final analysis.
3. Economic and livelihood slogans
These slogans reflect deep economic and livelihood grievances, which are considered one of the main triggers for the start of the protests among small retailers in Tehran’s bazaar. These slogans are rarely heard in the street.
Slogans such as:
• “Death to inflation”
• “Poverty, corruption, high prices—we’ll go until overthrow”
• “They shut the businesses; the shameless sat down”
This suggests that the initial economic spark has not necessarily turned into a nationwide movement with shared demands.
4. The complete absence of the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom”
Across the entire dataset from the first six days of the Dey 1404 protests, not a single instance—outside universities—of the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom” was recorded.
The complete absence of “Woman, Life, Freedom” is historically highly significant. This total silence toward a slogan that previously served as the beating heart of protest cannot be regarded as accidental; it signals a fundamental shift in the political atmosphere of the protesting class. While some insisted that the Jina movement, with its central slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi,” was a “revolution,” one can argue that this revolution has either failed, or—at best—after achieving its minimal goal (the loosening of strict hijab surveillance) has lost its driving energy and no longer has the capacity for mass organization. In either case, this absence signals a paradigmatic rupture.
5. The absence of democratic and legalist demands
In the slogans raised, there is no trace of key concepts such as freedom, democracy, the constitution, or the legacy of the Constitutional Revolution; even the word “freedom” appears only sporadically and marginally. This condition—marked by negation of the existing order and the absence of a new alternative, alongside a backward-looking turn—may be an alarm bell for the emergence of authoritarian tendencies: anger without a program, negation without horizon, and a politics emptied of institutions, perhaps shaped by expectation and hope for intervention by the United States, Israel, and Mossad. The outline of this structure can also be seen in the spread of obscene slogans.
The absence of slogans such as “Bread, Work, Freedom,” and the lack of demands related to the rule of law, the constitution, or democracy, show that this movement has not yet reached political maturity or articulated clear demands. The character of the demonstrations by Tehran bazaar’s small retailers—who initiated the protests—differed fundamentally from radical and armed protests in other cities such as Sarableh in Ilam province. While in Sarableh protesters came into the street with weapons, a large portion of videos from Tehran’s bazaar showed that bazaaris were even incapable of producing slogans, marching only in silence. The most common slogan heard in the bazaar was “Close, close.”
At the same time, the repetition of monarchist slogans in the absence of a structured pro-democracy discourse reveals the danger of a drift toward authoritarian models of the past.
6. The geography of protest
The protests have been concentrated mainly in central and western Iranian cities. Some political activists, following the pattern of past uprisings, expected strong participation from Kurdistan and Baluchestan—an expectation that is highly meaningful given these regions’ historical role in protest movements.
These analysts may not take seriously enough the risk of harsher killing and repression in these regions. Yet one must always remember: young people who imagine no future for themselves ultimately see the possible sacrifice of their bodies and lives before oppressors as the only option.
This time, however, in Kermanshah—unlike Ilam—the audibility of monarchist slogans helps diagnose political orientations. Baluchestan joined the demonstrations only on Friday after Friday prayer, and the regime did not confront the demonstrators.
7. The ideological difference between urban demonstrations and the Tehran bazaar small retailers’ protests
The slogan “Pezeshkian, be ashamed—give up the presidency” was heard only in Tehran’s bazaar and was not repeated in any other city. This shows that the professional demands and protest orientation of Tehran’s bazaar had features distinct from the nationwide protests. In terms of slogan content, Tehran’s bazaar not only carried its own specific demands; it also moved along a different discursive orbit.
This difference shows that the initial spark of the protests did not necessarily lead to the formation of a nationwide movement with homogeneous demands. The bazaar’s retreat after a few days and the discontinuation of its presence—despite the spread of nationwide protests—indicate an ideological rupture, an ideology that distinguishes outside from inside the regime. What became prominent at the national level, then, was not affirmative, programmatic demands, but slogans with a predominantly negative character—an impasse that points even more strongly to the absence of a shared emancipatory horizon.
Where is this movement without ideology and organization going?
Based on the pattern of slogans, protesters appear to lack a coherent ideology and, at the same time, lack organization; they have stalled at the stage of absolute negation and have not reached the stage of affirmative demands. Those with experience in organized protest work know well that one of the most basic stages of any protest movement is the drafting and setting of specific slogans for demonstrations.
These protests, at least in their current state, are moving neither toward democratic demands nor toward a defined political project. Until affirmative demands, a democratic discourse, and durable organization take shape, this movement will either be worn down or become susceptible to being hijacked by authoritarian forces.
During Turkey’s military attack on the Afrin canton in Rojava (northwest Syria), the author—working with a three-person group—managed to organize coordinated demonstrations in thirty-one Kurdish cities. The main factor that made this level of organization possible was not merely an emotional reaction to the attack, but the political and experiential groundwork of local society: the epic of resistance in Kobani and Shengal against ISIS, and the role of Kurdish forces—including the YPG and forces linked to the Kurdish freedom movement—in stopping and pushing back ISIS, had generated symbolic capital, political legitimacy, and experience of organization. In addition, the familiarity of many of these cities with the issue of Abdullah Öcalan’s imprisonment, and the linkage of social struggle to women’s liberation, enabled the translation of anger and solidarity into organized collective action. The Turkish regime’s claim to occupation further intensified popular rage.
The central difference between that experience and Iran’s current situation lies here: there, the negation of the enemy was accompanied by a recognized affirmative horizon and pre-existing networks of trust and organization. Whereas in today’s protests in Iran, the negation of the Islamic Republic—however widespread and radical it has become—has not yet been connected to a shared affirmative narrative, a coherent political language, or durable structures of collective and organizational action. Without filling this vacuum, the protests will, at best, remain episodic eruptions—and, at worst, become fuel for projects that are neither democratic nor emancipatory.
