Washington’s message to the Islamic Republic is blunt: act like a “rational” Middle East player, choose between the U.S. and China—and if you choose Beijing, be ready for the hour of attack.
With only a few days left until the end of Donald Trump’s “10 to 15 day” deadline to reach a deal with the Islamic Republic, the region appears to be moving toward a “point of no return,” and the momentum toward war has not slowed. Tehran is visibly anxious. Behind diplomatic language, there is commotion. Final cards and last offers are being drafted—anything that might carry the Islamic Republic through this “dangerous pass.”
The leadership is doing what it has always done: survival at any cost. That is why it now seems to believe it can turn a security dossier into a buisiness one—this time using money, contracts, and “investment opportunities for American companies.” Why? Because it has cultivated a class of theorists who have been telling it for months that, with a “nuclear sunset” and an “oil sunrise,” it can stitch together a deal with what the hardliners inside Iran call “Trump the gambler” that would make him leave the Islamic Republic and its leaders alone.
Majid Shakeri—one of these theorists trained in think tanks linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—has been pitching this idea to top officials for a long time. He has repeated it again and again since the twelve-day war: an idea that tries to settle a strategic conflict through the logic of an accounting buisiness model.
In the post-war deadlock, he proposed an oil deal with Trump: Iranian oil would be pre-sold and folded into the energy portfolio of American companies; in return, Iran would both push back the shadow of war and. Now that the U.S. military posture around Iran is said to be complete, and an attack could begin at any hour, he has tried to insert his ideas into Tehran’s final package to Washington.
Before him, others—such as Mehdi Kharatian, another security blogger—had urged the regime to use oil as a balancing tool to revive deterrence: to play with oil as leverage over Washington and to push China into a more active role in the dangerous confrontation between Washington–Tel Aviv and Tehran. For that idea, it is now too late. But for bloggers, every new situation can be an opportunity for a new idea.
That is why these security bloggers close to the IRGC and security agencies argue that, in confronting Trump, Iran should raise the level of “madness” until he backs off. One speaks of a preemptive strike; another of a “Doomsday scenario”—instead of acting rationally in response to U.S. military positioning, do something that makes the other side assume it faces a madman for whom costs do not matter.
This idea has, at minimum, become popular with the Supreme Leader, who has used it in his speeches over the past two weeks. When he says the war will be regionalized and the U.S. aircraft carrier will be sunk, it signals that—at least at the level of public speech—he does not mind deploying the “madman theory.” What happens afterward seems to have no place in the calculations of the regime’s security bloggers or its leader. For instance, what consequences might follow from sinking an aircraft carrier—the backbone of the U.S. military? In any case, every action has a reaction, and in the military realm that reaction is not necessarily “equal and opposite” in a neat, symmetrical way.
What’s going on?
According to a Reuters report, a senior Iranian official said Tehran is willing to make concessions on the nuclear file: sending part of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium abroad, diluting the remainder, and even joining a regional enrichment consortium. But it would do so only if the United States accepts “lifting sanctions” and “recognizing the right to enrich.” The same report contains one key point: Tehran explicitly spoke of “investment opportunities for American companies in oil and gas.”
This is precisely the Islamic Republic’s attempt—out of desperation—to implement the idea of cooking up a deal with Trump. Tehran hopes that, with this initiative, the “package” will move beyond technical bargaining over enrichment percentages and centrifuge numbers and step onto Trump’s home terrain: dealmaking.
Why has Tehran turned to an economic offer for the United States? A simple logic drives the shift: Tehran wants to raise the cost of war in Washington and lower the cost of a deal. How? By combining a show of willingness to embrace “madness” with an economic package that creates an American stakeholder.
Reuters reported a week earlier that Iran’s basket of proposal with the U.S. also mentioned “energy, mining, and even aircraft contracts”—exactly the kinds of profitable sectors that can appeal to economic lobbying in the United States.
In this context, Persian-language media has also been buzzing about an “economic promise to America.” Even domestic critics of the idea end up confirming—almost inadvertently—that the regime has reached a new point: Tehran has realized that a nuclear deal alone no longer guarantees reduced pressure, and that bread matters more than melons and their watery sweetness.
A “dream” package for “Mr. Trump”
But what does Tehran’s last-minute offer actually include? If we move cautiously between confirmed data, media reports, and speculation, a few axes are clearer than the rest:
On the nuclear file, Tehran appears to want tactical concessions, not a strategic shift. Reuters says Tehran has floated options such as exporting part of the stockpile, dilution, and a regional consortium—while demanding “sanctions relief” and “recognition of the right to enrich.”
Yet the main knot remains: according to reports, Washington is still seeking an end to enrichment—and beyond that, wants to expand the file to missiles and proxy forces, something Tehran rejects.
On the economic front, Tehran’s offer is a green light for American entry into oil and gas, with attractive contracts for U.S. companies.
The distinctive point of the package is what Reuters highlighted: offering investment opportunities for American companies in oil and gas. Whether this green light also implies an economic-security arrangement vis-à-vis China is an open question. Would American entry into Iran’s oil and gas extend to giving them influence over who buys Iranian oil? In other words, is Iran handing its energy basket to Americans so they can use it to pressure China—or not?
Tehran’s logic is straightforward: if Trump can sell an agreement as an economic deal, it may become cheaper for him than war—especially since he seeks to stage success. This is the logic of “agreement as victory,” which media analyses also emphasize. But is the Islamic Republic’s logic overly optimistic? Does it account for great-power strategic rivalry? And if it does, how could the Islamic Republic carry out such a fundamental game change without falling from a security ditch into a deeper well?
Who delivers the “package”?
In the official narrative, negotiations still proceed through Omani mediation. News agencies have reported that the next round of talks will be held in Geneva, and Oman has confirmed it.
There are also media reports about Ali Larijani’s role. Persian-language outlets have reported that Larijani is taking Tehran’s proposed package to Muscat. At the same time, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, in a separate statement, that he does not know what Larijani is carrying on his trip.
On social media, a complementary account circulates: Mohammed Al Arimi, head of the Omani Journalists Association, wrote on X that “Ali Larijani is expected to arrive in Muscat on Tuesday and bring Iran’s response.”
In this round, Trump is playing with a short deadline: “10 to 15 days.” The deadline turns diplomacy into a countdown: either a deal, or “bad consequences.”
In such an atmosphere, Tehran’s economic offer serves a crucial function: buying time and building an exit ramp that lets Trump label an agreement a “victory,” even if concessions are limited.
But the problem is that the disagreements are not tactical; they are structural. And for structural conflict in great-power competition, you cannot bank on personal psychology.
If Washington’s aim is a fundamental change in Iran’s behavior—folding Iran into its own camp for an ultimate competition with China—then a “consortium” or “dilution” will not be enough. In that case, even oil and aircraft contracts are not especially attractive.
It seems the Islamic Republic has miscalculated the main purpose behind the current pressure. Iran’s proposed package would need something that flies above technical nuclear offers and oil contracts. Washington’s sensible—or nonsensical—bottom line to the Islamic Republic is this: be a rational Middle East actor, choose between the U.S. and China, and if you choose Beijing and continue the current course, be ready for the hour of attack.
