At least fourteen political prisoners were executed amid war and securitization, while more protesters—from Bukan to Mashhad—remain under sentence of death or at imminent risk.
In the forty days marked by war, military escalation, and an intensified security atmosphere inside Iran, the Islamic Republic carried out a new wave of executions against political prisoners and protesters. At least fourteen political prisoners were executed during this period, thirteen of them identified by name in the cases detailed below. Alongside these executions, more detainees from the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising of 2022–2023 and the January 2026 uprising now face death sentences or charges that can lead to execution.
What stands out across these cases is not only the speed of the executions, but also the political function of the death penalty itself: forced confessions, denial of independent counsel, torture, and a judiciary that appears to be using wartime conditions to accelerate repression.
A Rapid Execution Campaign
At dawn on April 4, 2026, the judiciary executed Abolhasan Montazer and Vahid Bani Amerian, two political prisoners accused of links to the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK). According to Mizan, the judiciary’s official outlet, they had been charged with “membership in a rebellious group” and “assembly and collusion against internal security through conscious contact with MEK operatives.” State media also claimed that “launcher components” and disguise equipment had been found in their possession.
But the record of their arrests casts doubt on the wartime narrative the authorities tried to construct around their cases. Both men had been arrested on December 22, 2023, long before the Israeli-American attack of February 28, 2026, and even before last summer’s twelve-day war. Their cases were not products of the current war; rather, the war seems to have provided the state with a more permissive atmosphere for carrying out their executions.
Vahid Bani Amerian, born in 1992–1993 in Sonqor, held a master’s degree in management and worked as an online teacher. He came from a family in which five members had been executed in the 1980s. He had previously been arrested in 2017 and 2018, sentenced to ten years in prison and internal exile, released from Gohardasht Prison in March 2023, and then exiled to Bashagard in Hormozgan. He was rearrested on December 22, 2023, taken to Ward 209 of Evin Prison, and reportedly held under severe torture for forty-eight days, repeatedly threatened with summary execution. He was eventually sentenced to death for “rebellion through membership in anti-state groups,” in addition to a five-year prison sentence on a separate charge of collusion.
Abolhasan Montazer, born in 1959 in Tehran, was a married father of two and trained as an architect. He was also arrested on December 22, 2023, and taken to Ward 209. A political prisoner both before and after the 1979 revolution, he was first arrested in Mashhad in 1977–1978, then again in May–June 1981, spending more than four years in prison. He was rearrested several times in later years, including in 2020–2021, when he was sentenced to five years for collusion, propaganda, and alleged membership in the MEK. He suffered from serious illnesses, including heart disease, diabetes, liver and kidney problems, and psoriasis. Despite a history of open-heart surgery and severe physical vulnerability, he too was sentenced to death and executed.
Their executions came only days after the hanging of four other political prisoners—Babak Alipour, Pouya Qobadi, Akbar Daneshvarkar, and Mohammad Taghavi Sangdehi—who had likewise been accused of ties to the MEK and sentenced in similar security cases.
Rights groups and international monitors have repeatedly stressed that in Iran’s political and security cases, defendants are routinely denied effective access to legal counsel, while confessions extracted under torture and coercion form the basis of the heaviest sentences, including death.
From the January Uprising to the Gallows
The wave did not stop with prisoners accused of links to the MEK. It extended directly into cases tied to the January uprising.
On April 5, 2026, Mizan announced the execution of Mohammadamin Biglari and Shahin Vahedparast, two protesters arrested during the January uprising. According to the judiciary, they had entered a classified military site, participated in its destruction and burning, and attempted to gain access to an armory. Their death sentences had reportedly been issued by Branch 15 of the Tehran Revolutionary Court under Judge Abolqasem Salavati on February 7, 2026, around one month after their arrest, and later upheld by the Supreme Court.
Yet reports surrounding the case suggest that the confessions were extracted under torture and pressure. Available evidence—including images from the fire at the Kaveh Basij base in eastern Tehran, as well as statements by defense lawyers—has cast serious doubt on the official version of events.
A day later, on April 6, 2026, the judiciary announced the execution of Ali Fahim, another January uprising protester accused of taking part in the same alleged attack on the Kaveh Basij base. Ali Fahim was the fourth person executed in this case. Before him, Amirhossein Hatami had been executed on April 2, 2026, followed by Mohammadamin Biglari and Shahin Vahedparast on April 5. In total, seven defendants in the so-called Kaveh Basij base case were sentenced to death on charges of moharebeh, or “enmity against God,” in a case centered on the alleged attack on the Kaveh Basij base in eastern Tehran during the January uprising, where authorities claimed the accused had entered the site, set it ablaze, and tried to seize weapons and ammunition.
Lawyers for some of the defendants described the proceedings as unfair and reported both torture and denial of access to independent counsel. With these executions carried out, only one defendant in that case remains under immediate threat of execution.
The execution wave also reached Qom. On March 19, 2026, Mehdi Ghassemi, Saleh Mohammadi, and Saeed Davoudi—three people arrested after the January 8 protests in Qom—were executed. Together with the MEK-linked cases and the Kaveh base case, their executions form part of a broader pattern: the death penalty is being deployed not as a last resort in credible criminal proceedings, but as an instrument for crushing dissent in a wartime security climate.
UN officials reacted with alarm. On April 1, 2026, Volker Türk, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, called on the Islamic Republic to halt all executions immediately. One day later, on April 2, Mai Sato, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran, also warned of the imminent danger facing prisoners on death row and demanded an immediate stop to the executions. Amnesty International likewise warned that the Iranian authorities are using capital punishment not merely as a criminal penalty, but as a means of silencing dissent and spreading fear across society.
Those Still Under Sentence of Death
Alongside those already executed, several more political prisoners and protesters now face death sentences or charges that could lead to execution.
According to the Kurdistan Human Rights Network, Branch 1 of the Mahabad Revolutionary Court sentenced Mohsen Eslamkhah, a 20-year-old from Bukan, to death on a charge of moharebeh. He had been identified in 2022–2023 for taking part in the “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” protests in Bukan, when he was only sixteen years old. Because of pressure and fear of arrest, he fled Iran and lived in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq until returning on August 1, 2025. After presenting himself to the Bukan Intelligence Office the next day, he was arrested, tortured for around two months in the Urmia Intelligence detention center, and forced to confess to involvement in the killing of a Basij member. He was later transferred to Bukan Prison, briefly released on bail, and then sentenced to death on February 17, 2026. He is now held in Bukan Prison alongside two other Kurdish prisoners under sentence of death, Raouf Sheikh-Ma’roufi and Mohammad Faraji. The sentence is especially alarming because Eslamkhah was a minor at the time of the alleged acts, and under Iranian law the Revolutionary Court should not have jurisdiction over cases involving defendants under eighteen.
Raouf Sheikh-Ma’roufi and Mohammad Faraji, both Kurdish men from Bukan arrested in late 2022 and early 2023, were likewise sentenced to death by Branch 1 of the Mahabad Revolutionary Court after three years of uncertainty and torture aimed at extracting confessions. Their families have reportedly been subjected to pressure and threats by security agencies since the time of their arrest.
Another protest detainee, Mihrab Abdollahzadeh, also remains at grave risk. On December 18, 2025, Branch 9 of the Supreme Court upheld his death sentence. That sentence had originally been issued in September–October 2024 by Branch 1 of the Urmia Revolutionary Court on charges of “corruption on earth” through alleged participation in the intentional killing of a Basij member.
In Mashhad, Mahboubeh Sha’bani, born in 1993–1994, is currently being held in Ward 6, the women’s ward, of Vakilabad Prison. She was arrested on February 2, 2026, by Intelligence Ministry agents in Azadi Square in Mashhad. Human rights reports say she was violently arrested by five male officers and one female officer, and that her motorcycle was confiscated. She now faces the charge of moharebeh, which in Iran can carry the death penalty. The accusation reportedly stems from her assisting wounded protesters during the Mashhad protests of January 8 and 9, 2026, using her motorcycle to transport the injured to hospitals and treatment centers. Rights groups have warned that, especially given the pressure placed on her and her lack of family support after the death of both parents, she too may face a death sentence.
This combination of executions already carried out and death sentences still hanging over prisoners across the country points to a broader strategy. Under cover of war, the Islamic Republic appears to be using the judiciary, and the death penalty in particular, to manage political crisis, deter protest, and deepen fear. The names listed here are not isolated cases. They mark a concentrated campaign of repression in which political prisoners, uprising detainees, and Kurdish protesters are all being pulled into the same machinery of death.
