Witness reports and research records suggest Iran may have used incapacitating chemical and drug-based agents alongside live fire in January 2026 protests, though independent verification remains difficult.
The crackdown and mass killing of protesters in January 2026 (Dey 1404) has been so extensive that a UN Special Rapporteur has warned of possible “crime against humanity,” and Amnesty International has called for the case to be referred to the UN Security Council. Alongside extensive reports of live fire, some testimony suggests something else may have been deployed as well: pharmaceutical-based agents and other incapacitating chemical substances.
Witness accounts of symptoms beyond tear gas
In a report based on eyewitness testimony from several Iranian cities, accounts describe security forces using tear gas and other chemical agents at the same time as shooting at protesters. Witnesses described effects that went beyond ordinary tear gas, including severe physical and respiratory harm as well as movement-related impacts such as sudden loss of balance, inability to stand or walk, and abrupt immobilization.
Reported symptoms include burning eyes and skin, acute breathing distress, repeated coughing, coughing up blood, dizziness, sudden weakness, fainting, loss of balance, and inability to move. In some accounts, protesters say they were incapacitated after inhaling chemical substances and then shot at while on the ground.
City-by-city reports: Sabzevar, Isfahan, Tehran, and beyond
In Sabzevar, in Razavi Khorasan Province, videos reportedly show security forces using non-standard weapons and vehicles marked with hazardous-material warnings.
In Isfahan, residents described chemical gas launched alongside direct gunfire and a combined smell likened to pepper, chlorine, bleach, and vinegar. They reported severe coughing, sudden weakness, and, in some cases, blistering and burns. Some witnesses described unknown devices that fired colored or smoke-producing material without the sound of a shot.
In Tehran, repeated gas deployment and the use of chemical agents were reported, with symptoms including choking, intense burning of the eyes and lips, inability to move, and sudden weakness. Witnesses also described the widespread presence of uniformed forces, the Basij, and plainclothes agents, along with vehicles used to remove the wounded and the bodies of those killed. Reports also describe direct gunfire, including at children and pregnant women, and ambushes by agents positioned behind residential doors.
In Shiraz, Kerman, Marvdasht, and Fasa, people reported symptoms such as vomiting, dizziness, swelling, blurred vision, muscle weakness, irregular heartbeat, and neurological signs. The gases were described as different from conventional tear gas, causing blistering, burns, voice loss, and longer-term physical and neurological effects. Taken together, these accounts suggest the agents used may have had severe, long-lasting, and disabling impacts, and that their deployment—alongside direct gunfire—made it easier to immobilize protesters.
Images showing security forces equipped with gas masks and protective gear, as well as unusual vehicles in Borujerd, have further fueled speculation.
Political claims in Europe
Two European political figures have also claimed that chemical agents were used during the repression. On January 17, 2026 (27 Dey 1404), a former UK Foreign Office minister told GB News, citing what he called a “credible report,” that there were signs the Islamic Republic may have used chemical or toxic substances against protesters. A Dutch member of the European Parliament also accused the Islamic Republic of using chemical weapons against protesters while criticizing several European governments for opposing the designation of the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization.
Research records and growing attention to “incapacitating agents”
In recent years, the idea that the Islamic Republic has explored drug-based chemical agents as weapons has drawn increased attention in Western media and research circles. One research institute has reported on Iranian work related to pharmaceutical-based agents, including fentanyl and medetomidine, and their potential for weaponization. A separate analysis published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has also focused on “weaponized pharmaceutical-based agents” in relation to Iran.
Another report, published during Donald Trump’s first presidency, stated that Iran had not notified the Chemical Weapons Convention secretariat about certain riot-control chemical capabilities linked to Iran’s defense sector.
A key study and its claims about a Russian model
Much of the discussion draws on an article published in October 2024 by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, later republished by a Washington-based policy institute. Drawing on declassified U.S. intelligence reporting, the article reviews Iraq’s chemical attacks against Iran, Iran’s chemical weapons development and deployment, and concerns that Tehran may have provided weaponized pharmaceutical-based agents to partners and proxy forces.
The study argues that since the early 1980s U.S. intelligence collected information suggesting Iran used chemical agents for tactical purposes on the battlefield. It also states that U.S. officials have been concerned that Tehran may already have provided such agents to certain partners and proxy forces.
From school poisonings to the street
The article also points to the wave of chemical attacks on schoolgirls across Iran during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, noting that Iranian journalists investigated the poisoning of thousands of students and that some considered the symptoms consistent with exposure to weaponized pharmaceutical agents.
Historical documentation and a turning point in 2002
The article cites intelligence documents claiming Iran produced roughly 100 tons of chemical agents in 1987, mostly mustard gas, and anticipated doubling that output. It also claims Iran carried out several limited chemical attacks from April 1987, including with an unidentified agent causing severe lung irritation.
It identifies a turning point in 2002, when Russian special forces pumped a drug-based chemical agent into a Moscow theater during a hostage crisis. Russian forces regained control and killed the attackers, but about 120 hostages died after inhaling the gas, widely reported to have been a fentanyl derivative.
Claims about development, deployment, and proxies
The article cites claims by Israeli and U.S. officials that after the Moscow theater incident, the Revolutionary Guards and Iran’s Ministry of Defense pursued efforts to develop chemical agents and delivery munitions, including grenades and mortar rounds intended for tactical use. It further claims the goal was to provide such agents to partners such as the Syrian government and proxy forces, including Iraqi militias and Hezbollah.
The study argues these agents can cause full loss of consciousness after inhalation, allowing forces to advance quickly and quietly, or to capture incapacitated people.
It also refers to an incident on October 31, 2019, during protests in Baghdad, when Iran-aligned militias assisted Iraqi forces. Some protesters reportedly exhibited symptoms inconsistent with ordinary tear gas, including loss of consciousness and unresponsiveness, and Iranian-made tear gas grenades were reportedly found at the scene.
Sanctions and chemical development networks
In December 2020, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the Shahid Meisami Group for “producing and optimizing incapacitating chemical agents.” The group is affiliated with Iran’s defense research organization established in 2011 by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.
The U.S. State Department later stated that the Shahid Meisami Group had close ties to Iran’s military institutions and had showcased products at defense exhibitions, including a hand grenade containing a riot-control agent and a fog-generating system capable of rapidly producing large volumes of smoke and haze.
International restrictions and Iran’s position
In December 2021, the conference of states parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention voted to restrict the use of central nervous system–acting chemicals for law enforcement purposes and to distinguish them from standard riot-control agents. Iran, Syria, and Russia opposed the decision.
In 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense described Iran as a “persistent threat” regarding weapons of mass destruction and stated that Iran was developing dual-use central nervous system agents for offensive purposes. Other sources, including leaked documents attributed to a hacking group, have also claimed that Iranian military universities are working on grenades designed to disperse medetomidine as an incapacitating drug.
What can and cannot be confirmed
What has been published so far about the possible use of chemical substances or incapacitating agents during Iran’s 2026 protests (Dey 1404) includes political claims, eyewitness accounts, and research analysis that still lacks definitive independent confirmation. The scale of repression makes verification extremely difficult. Proving the effects of such attacks typically requires clinical testing of victims and the injured—testing that is rarely possible under conditions of crackdown and fear.
What can be said with confidence is narrower: the Islamic Republic has a documented history of using chemical agents for crowd control, and available research suggests sustained study, planning, and investment in incapacitating agents. Whether the specific claims from January 2026 can be independently verified remains an open question under the current conditions.
