Iran’s judiciary punishes a woman singer, exposing the ideological logic and legal flaws behind the criminalization of women’s singing.
As news circulated about the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States, the Qom Provincial Criminal Court sentenced singer Parastoo Ahmadi and eight members of the team behind the Caravanserai online concert, a streamed musical performance by Ahmadi, to 74 lashes, a two-year travel ban, and a two-year ban on artistic activity.
The ruling was issued because Ahmadi performed an online concert without wearing the mandatory hijab and without official permission. The court cited Article 638 of the Islamic Penal Code and Article 743 of Iran’s Computer Crimes Law. The main charge was “offending public decency through the production and dissemination of immoral content.” The ruling is a first-instance verdict and can be appealed.
Zamaneh spoke with Saeed Dehghan, a lawyer and human rights lecturer.
The Basis of the Flogging Sentence Against Parastoo Ahmadi
Saeed Dehghan argues that the flogging sentence against Parastoo Ahmadi, like similar rulings, cannot be understood merely as a judicial-security power play against negotiations or diplomatic opening. In his view, the main issue lies deeper: in the ideological and security-driven nature of Iran’s judiciary.
He notes that the judiciary was shaped from the beginning of the 1979 Revolution by an ideological and security-oriented logic, and that this logic has now been reinforced under the leadership of Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei, who was trained in the Haqqani School, a hardline seminary in Qom. According to Dehghan, such an institution operates not to protect citizens’ rights, but to police and restrict ordinary life.
Dehghan adds that another possible motive behind such rulings is the display of internal power: a signal that control remains in the hands of the security-judicial wing of the system, not its softer political factions:
I do not necessarily see this behavior as being directed against negotiations or diplomatic opening. Perhaps this time it is different from previous periods, because many commanders involved in repression are themselves politically vulnerable and facing an uncertain future. Under such conditions, given the authorities’ usual claim that “we are all in the same boat,” it seems unlikely that such rulings are issued merely to oppose negotiations.
Dehghan concludes that the repressive nature of the Islamic Republic has not changed since the 1979 Revolution. With the judiciary’s current structure, he says, no fundamental change should be expected from it — just as one cannot expect a cactus to produce roses.
Legal Weaknesses of the Ruling
Dehghan argues that the sentence issued against Parastoo Ahmadi rests far more on political, security, and ideological grounds than on a solid legal foundation. He explains that many laws adopted after the 1979 Revolution are rooted in ideology, politics, and religion, and are incompatible with human rights principles and international standards:
Look, first of all, Article 638 refers to acts deemed “haram” — religiously forbidden under Islamic jurisprudence. But why should the legislator include a religiously forbidden act in the law, when whether something is forbidden or permitted depends on religious and jurisprudential interpretation? It can vary depending on which cleric has a positive or negative view of the matter.
Dehghan adds that the law must be clear, precise, and binding across the entire country and for all people living there, regardless of belief or religion. He then continues:
There is also a very serious problem with relying on Article 743 of the Computer Crimes Law, because that article refers to corruption, obscene content, and prostitution. Singing — especially when some senior Shiite clerics, whose rulings are followed by believers, do not even consider it forbidden — can never be classified as prostitution or corruption. Nor can the term “obscene,” as used in Article 743, apply to singing. At most, from the perspective of certain religious believers, it might be considered contrary to religious law. Therefore, citing Articles 638 and 743 is certainly wrong. This ruling does not merely have legal weaknesses; it faces a major legal challenge. It relies on selective and interpretation-dependent language, even though senior Shiite clerics themselves hold different views on the issue.
Dehghan describes the reliance on these articles as arbitrary and incorrect. He says terms such as “public decency” and “religiously forbidden act” are open to interpretation:
In principle, matters of personal taste should never have been inserted into the law — which they wrongly were. But even that wrong step is now being implemented wrongly. Even if a crime is properly defined in law, its punishment must also be proportionate. Here, none of these principles has been observed.
Practical Defense Strategies and Lessons from Similar Cases
Drawing on his experience with similar cases, Saeed Dehghan emphasizes that success in such cases cannot rely only on a narrow reading of legal articles. A key part of the defense, he says, is to mobilize professional support from artists inside Iran and especially abroad, while maintaining sustained media attention and using international human rights mechanisms.
These elements can help shift the case out of its current position, without contradicting the careful pursuit of domestic legal procedures or the observance of legal standards.
Dehghan adds that at the appeal stage, in addition to seeking a full acquittal — which he says remains unlikely given the structure of the judiciary — the defense should focus on suspending the sentence, delaying its enforcement, or converting flogging into a fine:
For reasons related to human rights standards, and also for medical reasons. Because of the harm caused by flogging, when someone has no prior criminal conviction, we usually try to focus on suspending the execution of the punishment. The legal possibilities of postponement and suspension can help a great deal, as can converting the punishment from bodily flogging. For people with certain medical conditions, flogging can be especially dangerous. It can be converted into a fine or similar alternatives.
Dehghan also notes a recurring pattern in cases involving cultural freedoms:
In general, when we negotiated over cases, we repeatedly saw that during periods of foreign tension or diplomatic negotiation, cultural freedoms — especially women’s rights — were usually among the first areas to be sacrificed.
He emphasizes that seeking a reduction in punishment can amount to an implicit acceptance of a wrongful criminalization. Instead, women’s singing should be understood as a civil and free act: there is no clear and explicit legal provision that criminalizes women’s singing as such; instead, it is punished through vague charges such as offending public decency or producing immoral content.
For this reason, he argues, the focus should not be on mitigation, but on suspension, postponement, or conversion of the punishment — for example, converting flogging into a fine. This approach, he says, helps preserve the argument that the ruling itself is unlawful, while also making it possible to use international human rights mechanisms.
This interview was conducted by Hossein Nushazar.
