The United States does not know whom to negotiate with in Iran. This is one consequence of Ali Khamenei’s killing. Mojtaba Khamenei has yet to emerge publicly, and a network of authority around him has not taken shape. For now, he is relying on his father’s old relationships and living off his political legacy. Under these circumstances, Ghalibaf and Rezaei are walking a tightrope. The problem is that if either claims to have the “final say”, he effectively risks being accused of “undermining the arrangements established by the martyred leader”: arrangements under which the Supreme Leader is supposed to have the last word and keep everyone, including the Revolutionary Guards, in line.
The letter from JD Vance to Tehran attracted attention not only because of its contents but also because of the person to whom it was addressed. The US vice-president had not written to Masoud Pezeshkian or Abbas Araghchi. His addressee was Mohsen Rezaei, the former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and current secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.
The irony is striking. In a war in which much of the military campaign was designed to destroy the IRGC as an institution and dismantle the Islamic Republic’s military and security chain of command, Washington has turned to someone whose political standing and credibility are inseparable from that very institution in an attempt to open a path towards negotiations.
We do not know how genuine these diplomatic exchanges are. In other words, it remains unclear whether the United States is sincerely seeking an honourable and relatively low-cost exit from the current war of attrition, and whether it is prepared, in pursuit of that objective, to accept the continued existence of the IRGC. The Trump administration’s record suggests that diplomatic initiatives may not always be genuine and that their sole purpose may be to fill the intervals between two military attacks.
Nevertheless, whether this diplomatic initiative is genuine or a deception, one thing is clear: from a realist perspective, even as Washington targets the IRGC’s military capabilities, it currently regards the organisation as an indispensable party to any agreement.
Contacting Mohsen Rezaei does not necessarily mean accepting all the IRGC’s demands or endorsing its political role. It does, however, suggest that Washington considers the Guards the most important actor in any scenario for ending the war. This is a contradictory situation, with different implications depending on whether events lead to a third war or negotiations culminating in a grand bargain. If Washington decides to make up for the failures of the 12-day and 38-day wars by launching a third, the IRGC and Mojtaba Khamenei will be at the centre of the renewed attacks. If, on the other hand, Washington seeks an agreement and peace with Iran, the IRGC and Mojtaba Khamenei will be the principal partners in this romantic rendezvous.
Thus far, then, the very institution that was supposed to surrender or be dismantled under pressure has become the single most decisive factor in determining the war’s ultimate outcome.
O Letter, On Your Way to Him…
News of Vance’s letter emerged on 28 October. On Saturday, 31 October, Mohsen Rezaei confirmed in an interview with Iranian state television that he had read the letter but had not yet responded. He described the American tone as having “changed”, without disclosing the full text of the letter or the details of its proposals.
Our information about the letter’s contents is second-hand. Sources both inside and outside the Iranian establishment have previously revealed fragments of similar correspondence, and their disclosures have not been entirely wide of the mark. According to these same sources, the letter proposes direct negotiations between the two countries to resolve their disputes, including those concerning the nuclear programme, sanctions and the blockade.
How much time and room Iran and the United States currently have to negotiate a grand, comprehensive agreement is an important question, but it is not the focus of this article. Asking what Washington intends to do with the IRGC is another way of approaching that question. The addressee of the letter matters as much as its subject. Rezaei is not simply a retired Revolutionary Guards commander whose telephone number Washington happened to find in an old address book. He now holds a position in an institution where foreign policy, the core of domestic security and the armed forces converge.
Is Rezaei the “Real Leader”?
The fact that the letter opens with “Dear Major General Dr Mohsen Rezaei” does not mean that the United States considers Rezaei the Islamic Republic’s real leader. In an article for the Washington Post, David Ignatius reported, citing US administration officials, that Washington sees Rezaei as someone who can maintain a connection with the Supreme Leader and help build consensus around a potential agreement. In other words, American officials are placing their hopes in Rezaei’s ability to build consensus among the different factions of the ruling establishment and the IRGC.
There is a difference between being the “ultimate decision-maker” and being “someone who can make an agreement possible”. A foreign negotiator may approach someone who does not exercise absolute decision-making authority but has access to several centres of power, understands their constraints and can secure their commitments. At the very least, the letter to Rezaei suggests that Washington is looking for someone with precisely these capabilities.
Of course, we should not forget that Washington has arrived at this assessment amid the current deadlock. Like its other assessments during the two recent wars, it could contain a margin of error ranging from a few percentage points to 100 per cent.
So Where Does That Leave the Government?
Under the Islamic Republic’s constitutional framework, the president chairs the Supreme National Security Council, and its decisions become enforceable once approved by the Supreme Leader. On paper, the council’s secretary does not replace either of these officials. Rezaei’s prominence does not, in itself, prove that Pezeshkian has been excluded from decision-making or that the Supreme Leader’s formal powers have been transferred to the council’s secretary.
But the legal framework does not explain the full workings of power. Occupying a position that gives someone access, trust and the ability to bring the Islamic Republic’s security and military establishment into line matters more than what is written on paper. Such a position confers “practical importance”, and for a political system facing an “existential threat”, respect for legal formalities is the last thing on the minds of its security and military officials.
Nor should we forget that Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has not been excluded from the negotiating process. He headed the Iranian delegation in earlier negotiations and, following reports of the letter, reiterated Tehran’s seven conditions. Both Ghalibaf and Rezaei have previously served as commanders in the IRGC.
Perhaps Trump is right when he says that the United States does not know whom to negotiate with in Iran. This is one consequence of Ali Khamenei’s killing. Mojtaba Khamenei has yet to emerge publicly, and a network of authority around him has not taken shape. For now, he is relying on his father’s old relationships and living off his political legacy. Under these circumstances, Ghalibaf and Rezaei are walking a tightrope. The problem is that if either claims to have the “final say”, he effectively risks being accused of “undermining the arrangements established by the martyred leader”: arrangements under which the Supreme Leader is supposed to have the last word and keep everyone, including the Revolutionary Guards, in line.
The crucial question, therefore, remains: who can not only negotiate an agreement but also guarantee that its commitments will be honoured?
When a Military Enemy Becomes a Diplomatic Interlocutor
Vance’s letter was not written in a vacuum. The logic behind choosing Rezaei is to find a way of ensuring compliance with the terms of any eventual agreement. If negotiations involve halting attacks and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, Washington will need the IRGC’s cooperation. An agreement reached with a diplomat who lacks sufficient domestic backing could fall apart during implementation. From this perspective, contacting figures close to the Guards is an attempt to negotiate with “real power” rather than its “legal façade”.
This is precisely the contradiction at the heart of the current situation. The primary objective of the two wars against Iran was to overthrow the Islamic Republic or fundamentally alter its character. In pursuing these objectives, the United States has faced, and continues to face, one major obstacle: the IRGC. What has produced the current deadlock of “neither war nor peace” is that Washington’s “minimum demand” is a fundamental transformation of the Islamic Republic, and the Guards will not hand the United States such a prize without exacting a price. Does it make sense, then, for Washington to seek a way out of the current deadlock through the very institution that created it? In other words, can the dismantling of the Islamic Republic in substance, which is inseparable from a fundamental transformation of the IRGC’s role and position, be carried out through the Guards’ own commanders?
The next question is whether Mohsen Rezaei can make commitments on behalf of every component of the political system, including the IRGC. Reaching an agreement requires three distinct capacities: accepting the terms, securing the cooperation of the relevant decision-making centres, and issuing orders that can actually be implemented. The letter to Rezaei may represent an American attempt to find the link connecting these three capacities. It remains unclear whether Washington has correctly identified that link or overestimated one individual’s ability to forge consensus.
Washington can entertain whatever assumptions it likes, but the IRGC has not yet been removed from the equation governing how the war might end. Nor should the Iranian side interpret this contact as evidence that the United States has come to terms with the Guards or changed its war objectives. The war between the United States and the Islamic Republic has not yet been decisively settled, and Vance’s letter may prove to be nothing more than a ploy.