The prospect of renewed US and Israeli military strikes against Iran, a possible US naval blockade, declining oil sales, the relentless rise in foreign exchange rates, widespread public discontent and the emergence of groups advocating armed struggle in the east of the country are among the many threats facing Iran. These are compounded by internal political divisions and the accumulated anger of sections of society following a decade of political repression. Together, these developments threaten not only the Islamic Republic but also the continued political existence of Iran as a nation-state. What exactly is happening within Iranian society under these circumstances is a question that is far from easy to answer.
Radio Zamaneh spoke with Taghi Azad Armaki, professor of sociology at the University of Tehran, about attitudes towards war, the overthrow of the government and armed struggle; Iran’s possible future in light of its current social conditions; and the political role of social forces that support or oppose the Islamic Republic at this critical juncture.
Reza Bidrani: Now that the country once again appears to be on the brink of war, different sections of Iranian society hold different views about the prospect of another conflict. How would you categorise Iranians according to their attitudes towards war?
Taghi Azad Armaki: People generally expect another war to break out because both the Iranian government and the US administration have positioned themselves for war. In my view, most Iranians believe another war is likely, but they themselves oppose it and are looking for a way out. Some have once again turned to Trump, effectively saying, “Come and finish the job so that this state of war can finally end.” Others have moved back towards the Iranian government, while the majority hope that some other force or set of circumstances will emerge to help the country move beyond the threat of war. Iranians have never fundamentally sought war, and they are certainly unhappy about finding themselves in a state of war today. Those who now hope for another conflict are, above all, suffering from uncertainty and desperation. They want this state of limbo to end, even if that means an attack by a foreign power. We have seen this before, although the experience of two wars changed people’s attitudes to some extent. My observations of Iranian society, however, suggest that a section of the population has now returned to that earlier state of mind. They once again want a foreign power to attack and bring the current situation to an end.
Bidrani: In practice, then, these people are advocating war out of desperation.
Azad Armaki: Actually, they are not warmongers. They simply want the whole thing to be over. They are thinking about bringing the current intolerable situation to an end. They do not want an atmosphere saturated with talk of war, jihad and military heroism to persist or reproduce itself in new forms. What they really want is a “better tomorrow”, but they do not know what that better tomorrow would look like.
Bidrani: Do you think these people constitute a minority or a majority of Iranian society?
Azad Armaki: Their numbers and proportions fluctuate. But I do not believe they represent the majority. I would estimate that around 30 per cent of Iranians hold this view. Another 10 per cent align themselves with the hardline factions of the political establishment. The remaining 60 per cent also experience desperation and uncertainty, but they do not see foreign intervention as the solution. They are waiting for something to happen. For them, a change brought about by some unexpected event is preferable to change imposed through foreign intervention. Iranians have historically tended towards fatalism. They wait for an event or an unforeseen development: the death of an important political figure, a major transformation in international relations, or something of that kind. This is the outlook and hope of the majority.
Bidrani: So, according to your assessment, between 20 and 30 per cent of Iranians would welcome war in the hope that it might bring about a better future. Then there are hardline Hezbollahis (a broad Iranian political constituency aligned with the Islamic Republic’s religious and ideological principles, particularly the authority of the Supreme Leader, distinct from the Lebanese organisation Hezbollah) who want war out of a desire for revenge. What proportion of the population do you think this second group represents?
Azad Armaki: Between 7 and 12 per cent. If you count such individuals within households, extended families and neighbourhoods, you will find that they are not particularly numerous. In an extended family of 40 or 50 people, perhaps only one or two hold such views. But these individuals are brought together and organised, making them appear far more numerous than their actual share of Iranian society would suggest.
Bidrani: So, in your view, roughly 40 per cent of Iranians favour war for different reasons, whether because they oppose the Islamic Republic or because they want revenge against the United States, while the remaining 60 per cent oppose it.
Azad Armaki: Yes, absolutely. And that 60 per cent encompasses a wide spectrum, from Hezbollahis to monarchists. Some are opposed to Islam, while others are sympathetic to it. Some are deeply attached to Iran, while others do not believe in the idea of Iran at all. Yet, for different reasons, they all oppose war. They want the country’s circumstances to improve through some other turn of events or an alternative course of action, such as dialogue, peaceful relations and so on.
Bidrani: Mohammad Fazeli recently interviewed a young Hezbollahi intellectual who argued that Hezbollahis come in many different forms, but the Islamic Republic usually presents only the stereotypical image of a Hezbollahi. Is there really such diversity within this social group?
Azad Armaki: That young man’s observation is correct. The Hezbollahi constituency is actually a complex spectrum. Some subscribe to only one element of Hezbollahi ideology, while others embrace many of its components. For example, some are thoroughly religious Muslims, committed Shiites and loyal followers of the Supreme Leader. Others incorporate liberal ideas into their political and social outlook and do not believe that traditional and ideological elements should completely dominate the structure and conduct of government. Some Hezbollahis have the potential to embrace Taliban-style or Bin Laden-style fundamentalism, while others are inclined towards reformism. Because of the conditions of war, the government, particularly state television, prefers to give greater visibility to radical and fundamentalist Hezbollahis.
Look at how Mohammad Reza Bahonar is being attacked simply for making one or two mild criticisms. Bahonar himself belongs to the Hezbollahi camp, but he represents a different voice from the dominant one. The mainstream, more powerful factions within this constituency do not want voices like his to be heard. In universities and across society, we encounter young Muslim Hezbollahis who remain loyal to the Islamic Republic but have different ideas about how to live and how to relate to other people. They are moderate and rational, and they attach importance to what they regard as “Iranian rationality” in their attitudes and behaviour. Interestingly, the most radical Hezbollahi factions are not particularly religious. Those who seek violence and bloodshed are not people of faith, prayer or devotion to God. Rather, they are individuals shaped within the Hezbollahi ideological structure. On the whole, they are frightening people.
Bidrani: Could we say that there are now Hezbollahis whose appearance and lifestyles differ from those of the 1980s and 1990s? In other words, they no longer necessarily have beards, short hair, formal trousers and untucked shirts, while the women in their families do not necessarily wear traditional full-body coverings.
Azad Armaki: Absolutely. We now have students like that at our university, and some of them are among our most accomplished students.
Bidrani: Apparently, we now also have some “irreligious Hezbollahis”.
Azad Armaki: Exactly.
Bidrani: Why do you think this paradoxical phenomenon has emerged in Iranian society?
Azad Armaki: It is a consequence of the “logic of radical action”. When you destroy the core of your ideological or theoretical framework, something else takes its place. Sometimes, you are expected to hold certain convictions, have faith and act according to those beliefs. At other times, all that matters is that you act, regardless of belief. This happened with the Mojahedin-e Khalq in Iran. The organisation was originally formed by people who undertook certain actions because of their convictions. But when those members were killed, others replaced them who remained faithful only to the outward forms of their predecessors’ actions. They ultimately destroyed both themselves and others. Today’s irreligious Hezbollahi does not practise faith, prayer or intimate communion with God, yet performs the same actions as a religious believer within that movement. These individuals lack both reason and faith, and consequently become extremely radical and violent. In my view, they are the most dangerous segment of the Hezbollahi movement. Such people exist in other political systems around the world as well: individuals who display intense loyalty and wield considerable power, yet closer examination reveals that they have become detached from the intellectual foundations of the very political system they serve.
Bidrani: But among non-religious Hezbollahis, there are also people who understand cinema, literature and music. Although their political positions may be radical, we cannot describe them as irrational. Masoud Farasati, for example.
Azad Armaki: They represent a different type. These people are familiar with the principles of civil society, but they speak in the voice of Hezbollahis. The content of what they say is not radical or fundamentalist; rather, it is the form of their expression that is radical and fundamentalist. Their everyday lives are much like those of other members of society.
Bidrani: Who, specifically, are the irreligious and irrational Hezbollahis you have described?
Azad Armaki: Those who use batons and weapons to violently drive people out of public life, even though they have committed no crime.
Bidrani: For example, those who suppressed the protests of 2025–26?
Azad Armaki: Yes. These were irreligious individuals who became instruments for destroying the foundations of Iranian civil society.
Bidrani: It seems that some Hezbollahis who are not religious and lead secular lifestyles support the government out of revolutionary conviction or a form of patriotism. Their argument is that the Iranian government must not be destroyed because the country itself could fall apart. They also reject the West because they believe Western powers seek to dominate Iran. Bijan Abdolkarimi is one example.
Azad Armaki: Yes, that is exactly right. These people are “situational” rather than permanent Hezbollahis. They have aligned themselves with the Hezbollahi movement under particular circumstances, but if those circumstances change, they will distance themselves from it. The genuinely committed Hezbollahis do not place much trust in these individuals. They use them instrumentally because, ultimately, they do not regard them as belonging to their own ranks. Of course, another group of these temporary and situational Hezbollahis do not necessarily support the government out of patriotism. They do so because it serves their interests. They may subsequently abandon their current positions for the same reason. We have already seen this among certain actors and other cultural figures who once supported the government but have since become monarchists.
Bidrani: Mohammad Reza Bahonar once responded to a woman who had declared that “the country belongs to the Hezbollahis” by saying that Iran has at most one million Hezbollahis. Are their numbers really that small?
Azad Armaki: No, there are more than that. In my estimation, 7 to 8 per cent of the Iranian population are Hezbollahis. That would put their number somewhere between five and seven million.
Bidrani: These are the genuine Hezbollahis, correct?
Azad Armaki: Yes, the genuinely committed, religious Hezbollahis.
Bidrani: If we also include those who are not genuine believers, what proportion of Iranian society would they represent?
Azad Armaki: Between 8 and 12 per cent, or approximately ten million people. That is a substantial population willing to defend the political system. Through this large constituency, the government can implement its policies, advance its programmes and maintain itself in power.
Bidrani: How important were these people, who gathered in public squares every night at the height of the war, to the survival of the Islamic Republic?
Azad Armaki: They played an important role, particularly in preventing the restoration of the monarchy. Their political presence on the streets is directed primarily against Reza Pahlavi’s project and the return of the monarchy, rather than against civil society. When civil society becomes more prominent and civic participation expands, the political role of these Hezbollahis on the streets diminishes. Their mobilisation diminishes, partly because some of them also support civic forms of political participation. But when Trump, Netanyahu and Reza Pahlavi enter the picture, this constituency becomes fully mobilised and remains so until the confrontation is over. In this sense, they saved the Islamic Republic from a collapse that might have resulted in the restoration of the monarchy. They are not necessarily opposed to positive transformation within the Islamic Republic itself, but they are certainly opposed to the return of the monarchy.
If we exclude the pro-war monarchists, many other sections of Iranian society were also opposed to the government’s collapse and the emergence of chaos in the country. For this reason, during the war, they too became politically active alongside the Hezbollahi constituency. In fact, the middle class played an even more significant role than the Hezbollahis in preventing the collapse of the political system and the outbreak of chaos. The Hezbollahis are primarily anti-Pahlavi, whereas the middle class is concerned about the country itself, regardless of whether Pahlavi or anyone else is involved. At least, this concern is more pronounced among the middle class than among other social forces.
Bidrani: But it seems that the main significance of the new middle class lies in its refusal to join those engaged in revolutionary protests or attempts to overthrow the government. In other words, most members of the new middle class did not take to the streets during the November 2019 protests or the protests of January 2026 because they wanted to avoid the possible consequences of the government’s collapse. By contrast, Hezbollahi groups did take to the streets during the war to preserve the political system.
Azad Armaki: Yes, I agree. Trump told the Iranian people, “We will attack, and you should take to the streets.” Who was he addressing? The monarchists. That is why, during the 40-day war, it was predominantly the Hezbollahi constituency that took to the streets to prevent the government’s collapse. But their presence on the streets was solely intended to prevent that collapse. The political mobilisation of this social force does not contribute to strengthening society or advancing development and democracy in the country. On the contrary, this social force represents a fundamental obstacle to the project of democratisation and development. For this reason, during the current conflicts, and especially after they end, we need to consider how to deal with this social force and determine its proper and constructive place within Iranian society.
Bidrani: Do you agree that the Islamic Republic is currently facing crises of legitimacy, political participation and governing effectiveness?
Azad Armaki: Yes. In fact, the crisis of participation is the underlying cause of the crises of legitimacy and effectiveness.
Bidrani: When a regime faces all three crises but has not yet experienced a “crisis of domination”—a situation in which its repressive forces can no longer maintain political control—is its collapse not a real possibility?
Azad Armaki: The collapse of such a political system would not be surprising. But what is particularly important in Iran is that society itself has become stronger. When a society becomes stronger, its political actions become less radical. In 1979, Iranian society was weak, and that weakness gave rise to radical political action. Today, society is stronger than it was then. As a result, it acts more rationally and seeks to move beyond the current situation through civic means, rather than by any means available, in order to achieve something better.
Bidrani: Many people disagree with you. They argue that the majority of Iranians now want the Islamic Republic to fall, even if that requires war. Have any opinion polls been conducted on this question?
Azad Armaki: Opinion polls show that people are dissatisfied. But they do not show that the majority believe a foreign power should occupy their country or that Iran’s defeat in war would pave the way for a better life. As I said at the beginning, most Iranians are hoping for the emergence of a new political force or a new set of circumstances that will allow them to move beyond the current undesirable situation. My claim that the majority hold this view is based on opinion polls, my everyday conversations with people and my professional understanding of Iranian society.
Bidrani: It seems that dissatisfied people who face greater financial hardship or have lower levels of education are more likely to support war.
Azad Armaki: Yes, absolutely. Such people naturally tend to be more radical.
Bidrani: Then how is it possible that, in a society where the majority live below the poverty line, most people would oppose bringing down the political system through war?
Azad Armaki: Your understanding of poverty is correct in economic terms, but not in cultural terms. Although the majority consider themselves economically poor, they do not see themselves, socially or culturally, as defeated and trapped individuals who have no choice but to adopt radical political positions or engage in radical political action. Improvements in education and public knowledge, access to new media technologies and a greater understanding of the wider world have given this social group a distinctive position. These qualities distinguish them from the poor whom Marx wrote about. The impoverished middle class in contemporary Iran does not suffer from cultural poverty. In fact, its cultural level is considerably higher than that of the middle class in 1979 or even 1997, because people today have access to more resources, information and knowledge, and are far more familiar with the wider world. That is why a revolution of the poor and dispossessed will not emerge in Iran today. Many of those who live below the poverty line possess a high level of cultural knowledge and awareness. Nobody can simply issue a call saying, “Poor people of Iran, unite for revolution!”
Bidrani: Finally, if another war breaks out and the attacks are so severe that the Islamic Republic also experiences a “crisis of domination”, losing its ability to control the country, do you think Iran would descend into chaos? Or has Iranian society reached a level of maturity that would prevent such an outcome?
Azad Armaki: I do not think we would descend into chaos. At most, we might end up accepting a new authoritarian government.
Bidrani: Would such a government emerge from within the Islamic Republic?
Azad Armaki: Yes, it would emerge from the military and political layers of the existing system. Something similar happened towards the end of the Qajar dynasty, in what some have described as “Iranian Bonapartism”.
Bidrani: In any case, you do not seem to believe that Reza Pahlavi has any chance of coming to power.
Azad Armaki: No, because he lacks the political stature and substance required. The next authoritarian force would therefore emerge from within the existing system. Reza Pahlavi and those around him cannot embody such a force.
Bidrani: What would the defining characteristics of this new force be?
Azad Armaki: It would adopt slogans of patriotism, national cohesion and order, promising to overcome the current crisis and lead the country towards a better future.
Bidrani: To what extent do you think the armed operations currently taking place in eastern Iran, as well as similar activities in Kurdish regions and those associated with the Mojahedin-e Khalq, could push the country towards chaos?
Azad Armaki: The majority of people will not support these movements. Even in the early years following the 1979 revolution, most Iranians, including those dissatisfied with the political developments of the time, did not support groups advocating armed struggle. Armed groups have repeatedly become active in Kurdistan, but they have not secured the active support of the majority of people in Kurdish areas. Iranian society is not inherently inclined towards radicalism and does not support such forms of action. Even today, in Sistan and Baluchestan, most people do not identify with armed groups. That is why no major upheaval has occurred in the province. Take Mowlana Abdolhamid, for example. He is a political figure who represents the traditional segment of society in Sistan and Baluchestan and among Iran’s Sunni population. He has explicitly distanced himself from these armed activities.