Armed clashes in Iran’s Balochistan intensified between September and mid-October 2026. On 12 September, members of the People’s Fighters Front (PFF), a coalition of armed groups formed in December 2025 in which Jaysh al-Adl is the principal force, fought government forces for approximately nine hours in Saravan, after reportedly being surrounded by security forces. Another clash in the area on 23 September killed two senior commanders, according to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces’ Quds regional headquarters. Iranian officials reported five armed fighters killed, while the PFF acknowledged four deaths among its members. Independent casualty figures remain unavailable.
Further attacks followed across Zahedan, Rask, Nikshahr and other parts of the province, targeting police and military personnel. In early October, the PFF reported several clashes with government forces and claimed responsibility for an attack on the Murtan police outpost in Rask on 12 October. According to local reports, members of the Fatemiyoun Division, an IRGC-affiliated paramilitary formation composed predominantly of Afghan nationals, were stationed there. The extent of their presence remains unverified.
On 13 October, fighting was also reported in the mountainous Taftan area, where local sources described the use of heavy weapons, reinforcements and reconnaissance drones. Separately, in the Kurin area near Zahedan, Iranian authorities announced that five alleged members of a kidnapping group and one IRGC serviceman had been killed in a security operation. These figures have not been independently verified, and the death toll from the clashes in Taftan remains unknown.
These developments coincided with the execution of Omar Dorostaran, who had been accused of membership in and operational support for Jaysh al-Adl, a Sunni Islamist militant organisation with a history of attacks on Iranian security forces and civilians. According to Tasnim, he had helped provide logistical resources and transport members of the group. Regardless of whether the allegations were substantiated, the execution illustrates how criminal prosecution and capital punishment also form part of the state’s response to the armed conflict.
Three aspects of these developments are particularly significant: the geographical expansion of operations from border areas towards urban centres; the emergence of clashes lasting several hours, with additional fighters or security forces reportedly deployed as reinforcements; and reports of personnel from the Fatemiyoun Division, an IRGC-linked militia originally organised to fight in Syria, operating within the region’s security apparatus.
However, the extent of the Fatemiyoun presence remains uncertain, and there is still insufficient evidence to conclude that a sustained insurgency capable of exercising territorial control has emerged.
Who Are the Armed Groups?
The best-known armed organisation opposing the Islamic Republic in Balochistan is Jaysh al-Adl, a Sunni militant group that began operating under this name in 2012, following the weakening of Jundallah and the execution of its leader, Abdolmalek Rigi, in 2010.
Jaysh al-Adl places Baloch ethnic and religious grievances at the centre of its political discourse, but it also has a history of deadly attacks against security forces and civilians.
The United States initially designated Jundallah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2010. In 2019, it amended the designation to recognise Jaysh al-Adl as the organisation’s primary name. This designation falls under US law and should not be confused with sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council.
A more significant organisational development came with the establishment of the People’s Fighters Front in December 2025. Jaysh al-Adl is described as the principal force within this coalition, which, according to available reports, also includes members of smaller groups such as Nasr and Muhammad Rasul Allah.
Ansar al-Furqan is another established armed organisation operating in the region, although the nature and extent of its relationship with the new coalition remain unclear.
The distinction between this coalition and Jaysh al-Adl is not merely organisational. In its more recent statements, the coalition has placed greater emphasis on ideas such as freedom for the people of Iran and opposition to the Islamic Republic, alongside demands concerning Baloch rights and the Sunni Muslim population.
This shift may represent an attempt to broaden its political audience beyond an exclusively ethnic or religious constituency. However, a change in political rhetoric does not, in itself, demonstrate a corresponding transformation in ideology, command structures or social support. Nor does the adoption of broader slogans about freedom and resistance to authoritarianism necessarily indicate a commitment to democratic principles.
Jaysh al-Adl’s participation in the coalition, given its Islamist background and history of deadly attacks, raises questions about the relationship between the coalition’s declared political objectives and its methods of armed struggle. It remains unclear what concrete positions the coalition holds on political pluralism, equal rights for women, freedom of belief, the rights of political opponents and the protection of civilians. Nor is it clear what mechanisms, if any, it has established to ensure accountability for the actions of its members.
Opposition to the Islamic Republic does not, on its own, guarantee that a political alternative is democratic. Equally, the historical discrimination and repression experienced by Baloch people cannot, in themselves, justify every form of armed violence.
Across the border in Pakistan, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and other Baloch separatist organisations are engaged in armed conflict with the Pakistani state. These groups, whose origins and political agendas are predominantly nationalist, should not be conflated with Jaysh al-Adl or the Islamist militant networks operating in Iran. Shared geography and ethnic identity are not sufficient evidence of operational cooperation.
What Is the Background to the Recent Attacks?
Armed confrontation in Balochistan is not a new phenomenon, but several significant turning points have emerged since 2023.
In December 2023, Jaysh al-Adl attacked a police headquarters in Rask, killing 11 officers. In April 2024, the group carried out coordinated operations against IRGC and police facilities in Chabahar and Rask, demonstrating its capacity to strike multiple targets simultaneously.
In October 2024, an attack on police forces in Goharkuh, Taftan County, left ten people dead. Jaysh al-Adl claimed responsibility.
In July 2025, an attack on the judiciary building in Zahedan killed at least six people and wounded 22 others. Jaysh al-Adl also claimed responsibility for that operation. The targeting of a judicial facility, where civilians were present, brought the question of civilian protection into sharper focus.
What has changed in September and October 2026 is not simply the intensity of the violence. Earlier operations were primarily characterised by ambushes against convoys or attacks on security installations, followed by withdrawal. The new coalition now claims to have kept fighters in position and deployed reinforcements when surrounded.
The clashes in Taftan also suggest a growing emphasis on pursuit operations, encirclement and the use of heavy firepower in mountainous terrain. Nevertheless, the recurrence of these tactics is not yet sufficient evidence of a transition towards sustained territorial guerrilla warfare.
Has the Foreign War Reached Balochistan?
The recent attacks have taken place against the backdrop of the US–Israeli war against Iran. In a statement issued on 6 October, the IRGC Ground Forces’ Quds regional headquarters described the armed fighters as “Zionist–American mercenaries” and attributed the attacks to foreign support. However, no public, independently verified evidence has so far been presented to establish that Washington or Tel Aviv have financed, armed or operationally directed the recent attacks.
The fact that the two conflicts are unfolding simultaneously—or that armed groups and foreign powers may have overlapping interests—does not, in itself, establish an organisational or operational relationship between them.
The possibility of an indirect effect from the wider war, however, deserves serious consideration. The Islamic Republic’s concentration of security personnel and resources on responding to foreign attacks, protecting infrastructure and managing the war in the Persian Gulf may have created operational opportunities for armed groups in peripheral regions. Reports of a Fatemiyoun presence in Balochistan are particularly significant in this context.
Originally organised to fight in Syria, the Fatemiyoun formation is now, according to local reports, present at some security positions inside Iran. If the operational deployment of these forces in Balochistan is confirmed, it could indicate that the Islamic Republic is redirecting part of its transnational paramilitary capacity towards domestic security.
Such a deployment, if verified, would not constitute military intervention by the Afghan government. Rather, it would reflect the use of IRGC-affiliated paramilitary networks whose members are predominantly Afghan nationals. The available evidence, however, remains insufficient to establish the full extent of this redeployment.
The border with Pakistan is another decisive factor. In January 2024, Iran carried out strikes against targets allegedly associated with Jaysh al-Adl inside Pakistan. Pakistan responded with retaliatory strikes on Iranian territory. The two countries subsequently increased their security cooperation. Writing in the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, security analyst Muhammad Amir Rana warned that an expansion of the regional war could place this fragile cooperation under further strain. He also emphasised that speculation about the involvement of Saudi Arabia or other foreign powers in directing Baloch armed groups should not be mistaken for established evidence.
Along the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, informal cross-border movement, smuggling networks and border sanctuaries may also influence the movement of fighters and equipment. Yet the existence of these networks does not demonstrate support from neighbouring governments, nor does it establish organised cooperation between Baloch armed groups and the Taliban.
Moreover, the history of this conflict cannot be separated from political and religious discrimination, poverty, the conditions of life along the border and state violence. The Bloody Friday massacre in Zahedan on 30 September 2022 marked a major turning point. Amnesty International documented the killing of at least 66 protesters, bystanders and worshippers, including children, during the crackdown that day. The protests that followed, unlike the activities of armed groups, continued largely through civic and religious mobilisation.
Conflating these two forms of activity is both a political and an analytical mistake. Baloch society cannot be reduced to armed organisations. Nor can demands for an end to discrimination, the right to organise and political participation be dismissed because such organisations exist. There is also no reliable evidence that the armed groups’ growing operational capabilities have been accompanied by increased popular support for them.
The human cost of state violence must also be assessed independently of the armed conflict. In its report covering the first six months of 2026, the Balochistan Human Rights Group stated that at least 95 Baloch citizens had been killed and 28 wounded as a result of actions by military and security forces.
What Is the Central Question?
Is Balochistan moving from a series of sporadic attacks towards a sustained armed conflict?
The answer depends on three developments: the new coalition’s ability to maintain operational and logistical networks within the region; its relationship with Baloch society and civil organisations; and the impact of the regional war on the Islamic Republic’s security capabilities, the composition of forces deployed in Balochistan, and relations along the Iran–Pakistan border.
The deeper political question, however, is whether the weakening of the central government’s military authority will open up new political possibilities for the people of Balochistan—or instead lead to an expanding war whose heaviest costs will be borne by those same people.
The experience of recent years suggests that the Islamic Republic’s military power has failed to end the conflict, while the escalation of armed attacks has, in itself, offered no solution to the longstanding demands of the Baloch population.
Against this backdrop, the danger of a cycle of repression and retaliation must be taken seriously: a cycle in which state violence becomes a justification for expanding armed struggle, while armed attacks provide the authorities with a pretext for intensifying repression. Such a cycle risks weakening civic activism and further narrowing the possibilities for pursuing the demands of Baloch people through peaceful means.
In Balochistan, the foreign war may have altered the balance of power, but it has not yet determined the outcome of the internal conflict. What is at stake is not merely the state’s monopoly on the use of force, but the very possibility of independent political action by a society caught between security repression and the militarisation of protest.