Trump and the Temptation of a Third War: Will the Bombs Wait for the Ballot Box?

With Republicans facing electoral defeat, could Trump turn another war with Iran into a final political gamble, with Iranian lives as the stakes?

Over the past several weeks, whenever the subject of Iran has come up, Donald Trump has promised bombing and a resumption of the war, but with one specific qualification: after the November elections. For a politician so fond of shock tactics and unpredictability, attaching such a precise timetable to his threats is somewhat unusual. That is one reason why the remaining days before the November elections cannot simply be described as the “calm before the storm.” Politicians in Iran, and indeed elsewhere in the world, know that dealing with Trump means entering a murky space in which the distance between professing love and pulling a gun can be “a fraction of a second.”

But “Trump’s psychology” is not the whole story. There are other reasons why the weeks before the elections could prove dangerous. This is a sensitive period in which the current military stalemate, domestic political pressure, and a security incident, staged or real, could light the fuse of a third war.

Nor is it yet clear whether Trump and the Republican campaign will simply sit back and wait for an election they are expected to lose without first playing another card. The “temptation of a new adventure” sometimes comes precisely when politicians see the political horizon darkening before them and, in an effort to transform the political atmosphere, become willing to resort to almost anything, including military attack.

There is an instructive historical example of such a “gamble.” In 1982, the government of General Leopoldo Galtieri in Argentina was facing economic crisis, widespread discontent and street protests. Argentina’s ruler saw the solution not in “caution” or “patience” but in a gamble. He invaded the Falkland Islands, known in Argentina as the Malvinas, whose sovereignty Argentina disputes with Britain. Galtieri hoped that retaking the islands would unleash a wave of nationalist sentiment and that support for “recovering the homeland” would provide a cure for the country’s domestic political crisis.

At first, the gamble did not appear to be a bad one. It actually worked. Crowds poured into the streets in support of the military operation, while protests over the government’s performance receded into the background.

There was, however, one crucial variable Galtieri had overlooked, and as so often happens in gambling, it ultimately shifted the outcome not according to the gambler’s calculations but in favour of the house. Galtieri had underestimated Margaret Thatcher’s government and its willingness to respond militarily.

Britain did not wait. It dispatched a naval task force, and after a war lasting roughly ten weeks, Argentine forces surrendered. The war that was supposed to cure the domestic political crisis only made it worse. The humiliation accelerated Galtieri’s downfall and the end of Argentina’s bloody military dictatorship.

This historical example shows that rulers do not always enter wars with a precise understanding of the risks involved. Sometimes they gamble, convincing themselves that the dangers are limited and victory is close at hand.

What may be especially relevant to the present situation is that domestic political crisis does not necessarily make politicians more cautious. Discontent at home can instead drive a ruler to search for victory abroad in the hope of covering up failures at home.

But let us return to Trump’s frequently repeated timetable.

In an interview with Time magazine published on Thursday, October 1, Trump described a resumption of bombing after the November 3 U.S. midterm elections as “possible.” He also acknowledged that the war could damage Republicans’ electoral position. These remarks have brought the American political calendar directly into the debate over the timing of a third war with Iran.

In Washington’s account, Iran must accept conditions that the United States considers necessary to end the war. Otherwise, the option of renewed attack comes back into play. Indirect negotiations are continuing for now, but disagreement persists over the sequencing of concessions and actions.

Tehran insists that lifting the blockade and economic restrictions must come first, while Washington says the nuclear issue must be addressed first and foremost. This seemingly unbridgeable gap between Iran and the United States has created a situation in which negotiations and military preparations proceed simultaneously, with neither pointing towards a clear conclusion.

From an electoral perspective, “patience” and “caution” have an understandable logic. A new attack could push energy prices even higher, expose American forces to the risk of being killed, and once again place questions about Trump’s failure to achieve the war’s objectives at the centre of the election campaign.

A government that does not want voters scrutinising its record too closely may prefer not to create another military crisis. Under different circumstances, however, precisely the same logic could be reversed.

If Trump’s political and security advisers conclude that the continuation of the status quo will lead to Republican defeat, they could see a short, spectacular military operation as an opportunity to transform the electoral atmosphere. The likely objective of such a gamble would be to produce the appearance of victory, rebuild the image of presidential strength, or force Iran into making a significant concession.

There is no specific external evidence that such a decision has been made. This is an analytical scenario concerning what could happen. But a pre-election gamble might look something like this: an attack on Pickaxe Mountain, combined with a strike on a prominent underground “missile city,” for example in Yazd, and the occupation of Kharg Island.

Another scenario is also conceivable: an attempt to bring the war to some kind of conclusion before the election result turns it into a symbol of the administration’s failure. This is, of course, less within Trump’s control, but its logic is broadly similar to the previous scenario. Losing the Republican majority in the House of Representatives could intensify scrutiny of war spending, military objectives and decisions taken by the administration.

Yet an attack intended to prevent the consolidation of defeat could itself produce an even greater defeat. There is no guarantee that Iran would respond according to the American electoral calendar, or that military operations would remain within the limits Washington seeks to impose.

Recent U.S. military movements resemble preparations for every possible and plausible scenario. The United States has deployed around 9,000 sailors and Marines to the region along with naval vessels. One U.S. official has said that these movements could result in the simultaneous presence of three aircraft carriers in waters around Iran by late October.

The deployment does not necessarily mean that a decision to attack has been finalised. Increasing pressure, strengthening defensive lines, and rotating or replacing forces are also among its possible purposes. Greater readiness, however, shortens the distance between a political decision and the execution of a military operation.

For now, war after the elections appears about as plausible as war before them. If Trump still hopes to rescue the Republicans’ position through patience, he may hold back. But if he comes to believe that there is nothing left to lose, the same electoral anxiety could push him towards a “final gamble.”

In the remaining days before the elections, a security incident, a miscalculation, or reports that American troops have been killed could provide the pretext for a third war.

Unlike the two previous rounds of war involving Iran, this third war would also be intended to rescue Trump from his weakened political position at home. Going for broke is a plausible scenario, with unpredictable consequences. A war launched to save a ruler’s position may end up destroying it.

Trump may gamble with his own standing and political future. If he loses, what is damaged may ultimately be little more than his image as a “decisive and heroic president.”

But that is not where the tragedy of this gamble lies.

The real stakes are not its political consequences for Trump, but what he is gambling with: the lives of the people of Iran.

That is what has been placed on the table.

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